I. INTRODUCTION
T he administration of the real property tax makes it unlike any other ad valorem tax in the United States. Since most individual property parcels are seldom traded, an assessment process is required to estimate their fair market value.
1 Property assessment can be of signifi cant importance to individual property owners for determining their tax liability. However, under the "residual view" of the property tax, the assessment process in the aggregate is believed to be irrelevant to the revenues raised. the United States, local governments formally determine the property tax levy, which is the aggregate amount of revenue to be raised from the taxation of property to meet the predetermined aggregate demands of public expenditures (Ladd, 1991; Mikesell, 2011) . The millage rate is then a matter of arithmetic, as it is the result of dividing the levy by the total assessed values in the jurisdiction. Thus, under the residual view, if all properties experienced a uniform 10 percent increase in their assessed values, then the millage rate would be reduced so that the tax bill would be unchanged across all taxpayers in meeting the original levy. The formal role of the property reassessment is to maintain equity by keeping assessed values in line with their true market value. In fact, this is exactly the way in which textbooks in public fi nancial management and budgeting explain the setting of the property tax rate (Lee, Johnson, and Joyce, 2008; Mikesell, 2011) . Still, the taxpayer's individual property tax bill is determined by applying the millage rate to their individual assessment, which explains the widespread perception that local governments set rates instead of levies. As explained in the textbook on state and local public fi nance by Fisher (2007, p. 323) :
In other words, a general rise in property values allows local governments to increase property tax collections without increasing tax rates. Not surprisingly, some individuals are led to conclude that the assessment increase caused the tax increase. This view is not correct because each local government with property tax authority controls and selects, either explicitly or implicitly, the amount of property tax revenue to levy.
A popular criticism of the residual view, frequently raised by legislators, journalists, and citizens, is that local government offi cials take advantage of an increase in property assessments by only partially reducing the millage rate, so as to increase total real property tax revenue. Since property owners have their individual liability partly determined by the millage rate, local government offi cials can increase the levy and raise more revenue while lowering the tax rate and thus claiming they "cut taxes." These critics of the residual view thus argue that the property tax reassessment process is instead a source of fi scal illusion that causes the levy to be larger than the level preferred by voters.
Fiscal illusion has been a subject of substantial interest to public fi nance scholars, and it is thought to exist in a variety of forms (Dollery and Worthington, 1996) . Some forms of fi scal illusion relate to the structure of the tax code, where indirect, hidden, or less salient taxes cause voters to believe that the cost of public services is less than what they perceive it to be. Generally, the property tax is thought of as a fairly salient and visible tax (Cabral and Hoxby, 2010) . Renter illusion, however, is thought to arise if renters (incorrectly) do not expect these taxes to be shifted into higher rents from the landlord and consequently vote for higher levels of public expenditures (Bergstrom and Goodman, 1973; Blom-Hansen, 2005) . Another form of fi scal illusion, popularly known as the fl ypaper effect (Oates, 1979; Dougan and Kenyon, 1988) , occurs when categorical lump-sum grants are used to expand the public budget by an amount greater than an equivalent increase in voter income from other sources, typically thought to occur when politicians use the grant to suggest a lower marginal cost of taxation.
The fi scal illusion most closely related to property reassessment comes from the revenue-elasticity hypothesis that suggests increases in any tax base are automatically directed into new expenditures. As Oates (1975) observed, evidence for the revenue elasticity hypothesis is usually confounded by the fact that revising income or sales tax rates is costly, so an absence of rate revision in response to tax base growth is not necessarily a dismissal of voter preferences. This cannot be the case for property taxes, however, because local governments annually determining their expenditures are, by defi nition, nominally setting the tax rate, so there are no additional costs from rate adjustment.
This revenue-elasticity fi scal illusion critique of the residual view seems to have been infl uential in the passage of Proposition 13 in California (Mikesell, 1980; Martin, 2008) , as well as in the recent property tax revolt in Indiana when changes in assessment standards caused the taxable value of certain properties to rise signifi cantly.
3 Contrary to the residual view, national comparisons of growth in housing prices to property tax revenues have historically been highly correlated, as demonstrated in Figure 1 . The 3 Mikesell (1980) describes the popular view that increases in assessments caused higher spending expressed by activist-politicians like Howard Jarvis which lead to their successful push for California's proposition 13, passed in 1978. More recently, in 2010 Indiana voters passed a constitutional amendment, which is widely seen as a consequence of voter unrest resulting from a change in assessment on the basis of cost of replacement to current fair market values (Faulk, 2004) . 
Figure 1
Growth of U.S. Housing Prices and Local Property Tax Revenue, 1997 Revenue, -2009 Sources: Housing Price Index (Federal Housing Finance Agency, www.fhfa.gov), Local Property Tax Revenue (U.S. Census of Government Finance, www.census.gov/govs/). popular Mikesell (2011, p. 494 ) textbook on public fi nancial administration notes this critique in describing the administration of the property tax rate, "A government may, of course, see the computed rate, worry about the consequences, and revise the amount of levy it chooses to raise." Empirical evidence to support or refute the residual view, however, has been sparse. This is in part because policy makers may make "legitimate" changes in the levy to accommodate new growth in demand for public services, which often occur with growth in assessed values. Areas that experience the largest increases in property assessments might simply be high growth areas, or voters may demand more public services due to the wealth effects accompanying appreciation in the value of their homes.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a direct test of the residual view, a view that would be rejected if it can be shown that assessed value growth causes increases in the property tax levy. The analysis uses data from Virginia cities and counties between 2000 and 2008, where an institutional change reasonably approximates a natural experiment for testing the residual view. In 1984, the state mandated a fi xed reassessment frequency cycle that determines the number of years between reassessments, which varies across jurisdictions; this policy has the effect of causing the timing of contemporary assessments to mimic a random assignment process by making them independent of the economic conditions of the local governments. Data from annual assessment-to-sale price ratio studies allow us to further differentiate between changes in fair market value and assessed values, which differ because of assessment errors and time lags between mass reappraisals. The identifi cation approach allows us to separate the accumulated demand effects related to economic growth from the potential role of reassessment as a source of fi scal illusion. Our fi ndings are able to detect some fi scal illusion, where increases in assessed values and mass reappraisals cause higher property tax levies. This paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we provide a summary of the previous literature, followed by a section providing the necessary background to understand Virginia as a natural experiment for testing the residual view. The fourth section discusses the model and research methodology, and results are presented in the fi fth section of the paper. The paper concludes with a summary of the fi ndings and a discussion of policy implications.
II. PREVIOUS LITERATURE
To the best of our knowledge, there are just four papers - Mikesell (1978 Mikesell ( , 1980 , Bloom and Ladd (1982) , and Ladd (1991) -whose purpose is to test the residual view of the property tax. The general diffi culty with the existing literature on the residual view is that assessment growth could be correlated with broader economic growth, particularly if there is a marginal propensity to consume public services out of property appreciation that is distinct from increases in demand due to other forms of economic growth. Bloom and Ladd (1982) studied changes in property tax levy growth in 241 Massachusetts towns and cities between 1960 and 1978. After controlling for area and year fi xed effects, the results suggested that the enactments of mass reappraisals were accompanied by statistically signifi cant 3.5 percent increase in the levy growth rate for cities, but no effect was found in towns. However, the regressions had no other control variables, raising the possibility of omitted variable bias, and the mass appraisals were performed at the discretion of the municipalities, perhaps resulting in an endogeneity bias. Ladd (1991) replicated the specifi cation from Bloom and Ladd (1982) using data from North Carolina from 1960 to1984, where she argued the state mandates of reappraisal frequency set in earlier years allowed for a more exogenous reappraisal process than was observed in the earlier study of Massachusetts. The fi ndings from North Carolina in Ladd (1991) indicated that mass reappraisals were correlated with increased property tax levy growth of 3 to 8 percent. While there were no other annual control variables other than year and area fi xed effects, the results were re-estimated after splitting the sample by income level and population growth. The evidence from these specifi cations was somewhat more mixed, suggesting these could be potentially important omitted variables. In fact, both Bloom and Ladd (1982) and Ladd (1991) framed their model as a median voter public service demand function, in which case theory would suggest that population and income would play a strong role.
The earliest test of the residual view was by Mikesell (1978) , who estimated a timeseries regression of total property tax levies in the state of Indiana between 1950 and 1972 on state personal income, household personal property, and a dummy variable indicating the presence of a mass reappraisal. The mass reappraisal dummy was associated with a 0.01 percent increase in property tax levies, a magnitude that is neither substantively nor statistically signifi cant. While this fi nding is consistent with rate adjustment, it must be qualifi ed by the observation that it was local rather than the state governments that determined levies and assessments, so the state-level time-series approach suffered from aggregation bias. Mikesell (1980) again studied the residual view, examining counties and independent cities in Virginia from 1973 to 1975. He fi nds reassessments had an effect on the nominal rate consistent with rate revisions that offset changes in assessed values, but not on the effective tax rate. 4 This provided some evidence that Virginia counties were not completely offsetting the change in property assessed values with tax rate adjustments, but the measurement of base growth using the assessment-to-sales price ratio did not allow for a clear inference on how large or small the effect could have been.
Beyond papers directly interested in the residual view, related research on the relationship between housing prices and property tax revenues can be informative in terms of testing the hypothesis. One of the more recent examples is Lutz (2008) , who estimates property tax revenue growth among local governments located in Metropolitan Statisti-cal Areas between 1985 and 2005 as a function of multiple lags in the Federal Housing Finance Agency's (FHFA) housing price index. 5 The regression results reveal that the property tax revenue elasticity with respect to housing prices is greater than zero but less than one, and the author concludes that property tax rates must partially decline in response to changing housing prices. Interestingly, Lutz (2008, p. 566 ) also suggests that this result is partially explained as an institutional consequence of unchanging property assessments:
Institutional features of the property tax, such as delays in bringing assessed values into line with market values and caps and limitations on the tax, likely explain the lag between house price and tax revenues (and may also infl uence the magnitude of the relationship).
In essence, Lutz's proposed interpretation seems to be that increases in assessed values cause property levy increases and rate changes are caused by voter demand, which would be somewhere between the residual view taught in textbooks and the opposing fi scal illusion view of its critics. The paper provides a useful point estimate on the general elasticity of housing prices to property tax increases, but it also highlights why research explaining property tax levies with only fair market value growth do not provide direct evidence on the residual view. 6 Other papers (e.g., Alm, Buschman, and Sjoquist, 2011; Doerner and Ihlanfeldt, 2011; Lutz, Raven, and Shan, 2011) which investigate property tax revenues and house prices have this same qualifi cation when it comes to implications for the residual view: without assessed values in the regression, it is not possible to differentiate between voter demand shocks and policy makers taking advantage of fi scal illusion in revising the rate.
In summary, the previous literature on the residual view has produced mixed results, and may suffer from omitted variable bias. Specifi cally, what is needed is an approach in which change in assessed values is not contaminated by other growth variables. The next section provides the institutional background on Virginia's administration of property taxes and real property assessments analyzed in this study.
III. BACKGROUND ON VIRGINIA PROPERTY TAX ADMINISTRATION
Detractors of the residual view are essentially claiming that changes in assessed property values cause changes in the property tax levy through a form of revenue-elasticity fi scal illusion among the voters. Since the most signifi cant changes in assessed values result from mass reappraisals, the ideal natural experimental setting for testing the effect of property reassessments would be to observe a set of local governments for which true property value growth could be observed by the researcher, but property reappraisals were determined by random assignment. As a result, the property reassessment process would be exogenous to the determination of the levy. Furthermore, to be a viable application of the median voter demand model, the policy makers of these governments would have no external constraints imposed by the state in setting their budget with respect to their ability to set the revenues raised from the property tax.
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As previously described, changes in the property assessments might refl ect underlying economic growth effects, which could confound an empirical investigation in the determination of the levy. In most instances, however, assessment values are usually the only widely available data on underlying property growth. It is also conceivable in some instances that property assessments are conducted in some endogenous manner, particularly if there is no cyclical basis for reappraisals. This would be particularly problematic if updates in the property tax rolls coincided with planned changes in property tax levies, perhaps to assure local voters of a more equitable expansion of the tax base or to take advantage of fi scal illusion. Furthermore, some states have statutory limitations on property taxes that create a different set of incentives. Local governments may be constrained, for instance, in the amount of revenue growth from one year to the next (e.g., California) or with caps on the property tax liability as a share of assessed values (e.g., Indiana). These types of constraints might induce governments to behave strategically to accommodate median voter demand, both in terms of setting the levy and/or in terms of setting the assessment level.
Virginia is home to 134 counties and independent cities, generically referred to here as "counties," where the institutional conditions reasonably approximate the natural experimental setting described above.
8 First, the state imposes no serious limitation on policy makers in taxing property. The only requirement they face is that notice must be given in a local newspaper if the property tax levy is to grow more than one percent from the previous year. The Virginia Department of Taxation also conducts an annual "sales price ratio study," in which fair market transactions are randomly sampled across the state and each property's selling price is compared to the assessed value at the time of the sale. The median ratio of assessed value-to-sale price (sales ratio) and other common measures are computed and used to evaluate the accuracy of property assessments in each county. These sales ratio studies are published annually, but with an approximate lag of 2-3 years after the sales actually take place, and therefore 1-2 years after the budgeting process. These annual estimates of fair market value growth can be used to capture the amount of growth that might induce demand for more public services.
Property tax levies in Virginia are determined by a county council of elected representatives, usually called the "Board of Supervisors." This council varies in number according to the county, and the terms of council members are typically staggered so that different members are up for election in different years. The county is the primary level of general purpose local government, and it is responsible for most local public services such as health, welfare, and education. 9 In addition, special governments within the counties may be delegated differing responsibilities (library, fi re, etc.) and must coordinate with the county, usually by proposing their own budget to the council for approval. The property assessment process is also undertaken at the county level, but under the auspices of the county Commissioner of Revenue, who is also an elected offi cial. The local Commissioner of Revenue will either maintain the property tax rolls directly, or appoint a distinct property assessor offi ce whose department assumes this responsibility. Thus, in Virginia, the elected body responsible for determining the tax burden is distinct from the one that determines property assessments.
Virginia is a strong Dillon Rule state, so public service responsibilities are relatively homogeneously delegated across county governments. 10 This results in a reasonably comparable group of governments and establishes a useful scenario for the remaining critical aspect of a natural experiment -the timing of mass reappraisals across counties. In 1984, the Virginia Tax Code required that all county governments adopt a frequency cycle for property reassessment.
11 Historically, many Virginia counties would have long periods of time between reappraisals, over 10 years in some cases (Mikesell, 1980) . The law stipulates that, for all properties, the frequency of reassessment will be greater for the higher population counties than for those with lower populations. Independent cities with populations above 30,000 are required to reassess biannually, while those below this threshold may choose to reassess either annually or every four years. Counties must reassess every four years, but they can elect a fi xed 1, 2, 5, or 6-year cycle if their population is below 50,000. Counties do have the ability to change their assessment cycle frequency, but this is rarely the case and is largely driven by compliance with state law as their population grows or shrinks. 12 The difference in frequency of reassessment cycles results in the contemporary situation where every year has a different set of counties conducting mass reappraisals. Between 2000 and 2008, there were no two years in Virginia with exactly the same set of counties conducting mass property reassessments. As a result, the specifi c year in which a county reappraises property is exogenous to the determination of the property levy, and therefore is probably as close 9 Public school districts are operated at the county level in Virginia. 10 "Dillon's Rule" is the legal precedent that local governments only have the powers and authorities that have been explicitly granted to them by the state. 11 Discussion of the virtues and trade-offs of options in setting reassessment cycles can be found in Mikesell (1980) and Stine (2010) . 12 The only example we have found of changing reassessment frequency in the time frame of our data occurred from 2000 to 2001 as the independent city of Clifton Forge lost its status as county equivalent, and was merged with the encompassing Alleghany County, effectively increasing its population.
to a random assignment as is possible. It would seem unlikely that counties determining their assessment frequency cycle in 1984 would do so for the explicit purpose of having a property reassessment take place in a particular year during the millennium decade to hide a tax levy increase. Virginia's reassessment cycles and sales ratio studies also play an important role in distinguishing between growth in fair market values and assessed values, since in principle the two should be relatively collinear. However, multi-year lags between mass reappraisals create a situation where the year-over-year change in assessed value growth will refl ect cumulative changes in fair market values rather than just single year growth. Furthermore, the accuracy of the assessment process, as measured by Virginia's previously described sales ratio studies, is not universal across counties. Typically, a county that conducts a mass reappraisal will have a median sales ratio indicating that parcels have an assessment that is 90 to 110 percent of estimated fair market value.
In order to identify the possible role of property reassessment in concealing levy growth, there is another important institutional detail in the timing between when the change in assessed value is known to the owners and when it is used in setting the rate. Most property reassessments are conducted within the fi rst three months of the calendar year, with the latest being conducted in June, and the balance of the year is used for giving notice to the residents and the opportunity to appeal. The budget is set prior to the end of the fi scal year, and as a consequence, property reassessments are not refl ected in a new millage rate until the next calendar year. As an example, even if the reappraisals were conducted in calendar year 2005, it would not be refl ected in the millage rate confronting the taxpayer until the next year when the budget was being set for Fiscal Year 2006 Year -2007 . This institutional setting allows us to model demand for public services as being a function of contemporaneous market value appreciation, and the lagged period where the intermittently-updated assessed values are fi nally adopted into the property tax rate as representing the opportunity for policy makers to take advantage of any fi scal illusion.
A preliminary look at data from Virginia also reveals why critics may feel the principle of the residual view is not being met. Figure 2 compares the average real property tax levy against the average property tax millage rate between 1999 and 2009. As Figure  2 reveals, on average property tax rates have remained relatively constant, even fallen slightly, while the average revenue raised from real property taxation has more than doubled over the same period. For the pattern in Figure 2 to hold, it had to be the case that growth in assessed values kept pace with the levy so as to remain rate neutral, and Figure 3 confi rms this to be the case. These averages, of course, mask a considerable amount of underlying heterogeneity in the conditions experienced across counties, but one can observe why critics of the residual view might be concerned that rates do not properly adjust. Furthermore, levy growth is higher in years in which the budget is based on mass reappraisals at 5.1 percent, as compared to just 2 percent in non-mass reappraisal years. However, Figure 3 also demonstrates that assessed values have largely been in accordance with estimates of fair market value growth in the areas. This suggests that demands for public services that accompany economic growth may be the main predictor of levy growth in a more sophisticated multivariate regression, the derivation of which is the subject of the next section.
IV. MODEL DETERMINATION AND VARIABLE SELECTION

A. Empirical Model
The essence of the fi scal illusion view is that local offi cials can deviate from the median voter's preferences in setting expenditure levels under the cover of rising property assessments. To test this rejection of the residual view, the model in this paper starts with the median voter demand model in the tradition of Borcherding and Deacon (1972) , a model frequently employed in empirical work to test the degree of non-rivalry in local public expenditures. 13 This model is assumes a decisive voter in area i who receives utility from the quantities of private goods X i and public goods g i . Using G i to represent total public good provision, the degree of population (N i ) rivalry of the good or service determines the individual level of consumption, resulting in g i = N i -γ G i , where γ is a congestion parameter. The decisive voter's income I i can be used to allocate expenditures across the two goods, with the resulting budget constraint of I i = P x X i +T i P g G i , where T i is the median voter's share of the tax burden. Substituting g i N γ in lieu of G i into the budget constraint results in a demand equation of the form g i = g i (I i ,P x ,T i ,P g ,N) . Assuming that input prices to public service production are constant across the state, and representing individual voter taste characteristics by the vector V i , a constant elasticity demand function can be defi ned as
-γ G i into the left-hand side and rearranging results in
where λ = (1 + α)γ. Since the quantity of government services is typically unknown, the literature proxies for these services using expenditures, implicitly assuming that there is a constant dollar cost per unit of public goods and services. The log-log form of (1) is then estimated using linear regression methods; this approach is adopted in this paper to identify local government expenditures. From an accounting perspective, balanced Source: Virginia Department of Taxation (www.tax.virginia.gov) budgets require that government spending G i in a given year equals the property tax levy L i plus revenue from other sources R i . In Virginia counties, these other non-property tax revenue sources are predominantly intergovernmental transfers, various user fees, and cigarette taxes. Once the local government has identifi ed revenue from all other sources, it determines total spending by issuing the property tax levy. Median voter income is composed of annual income fl ow Y i and the income from the fair market value of their real property H i , although data limitations require us to proxy the latter with the current market value. 14 This income is assumed to be
, which implies that the marginal propensity to spend on services may differ between incomes and property values. Substituting into (1) and adding a temporal dimension results in the following logged empirical demand function for the property tax levy (2) lnL it = βlnV it + αlnT it + λlnN it + ηlnY it + πlnH it + δlnR it + ε it .
The expected signs are negative for the coeffi cient on the tax price α and positive for the coeffi cients on housing values π, population λ, and income η. The theoretical literature on the fl ypaper effect of other revenue sources suggests that the expected sign of R it is ambiguous (Fisher, 1982; Hamilton, 1983; Hines and Thaler, 1995) . Empirically, it is likely that there exist unobserved time invariant fi xed effects, so (2) is fi rst differenced to eliminate them (3) lnL̃i t = βlnṼi t + αlnT̃i t + λlnÑ it + ηlnỸ it + πlnH̃i t + δlnR̃i t + ε̃i t .
Using a tilde to represent fi rst differences, the model in (3) is consistent with the view that local public offi cials inherit the previous year's budget and then update it for the upcoming year to refl ect new circumstances and information. This is done during the budgeting stage, where policymakers have the opportunity to revise the levy, while anticipating the effect on the millage rate. As already described, critics of this process have claimed that property reassessments provide cover for public offi cials to increase the levy beyond that preferred by the constituency. If the residual view is correct, then reassessing property values will have no impact on the levy itself. To consider this possibility, we augment the model in (3) with the fi rst differenced log of assessed values AV and a dummy variable for the reassessment A, (4) lnL̃i t = βlnṼi t + αlnT̃i t + λlnÑ it + ηlnỸ it + πlnH̃i t + δlnR̃i t + ρAit
The dummy variable A it takes the value of one if the levy was set with assessed values following a mass reappraisal, whereas the continuous variable AV it is used to calculate the magnitude of the change in assessed values used in setting the rate. 15 The interaction between the two is employed to distinguish the behavioral response between years with and without mass appraisals. The critical assumption is that current period public service demands are a function of current fair market value appreciation, and that the median voter does not update demand on a cycle that mimics the cycle between reassessments adopted for the budget process. Since some jurisdictions go as long as six years between mass reappraisals, the percentage increases can be orders of magnitude larger than the years between assessments, so the adjustment of the rate may be substantially different in these two sets of years. The marginal effects of interest to testing the residual view are
Consider fi rst the marginal effect of changes in assessed values (5) during years where budgets are not based on mass reappraisals (A it = 0). 16 The claim of the residual view is that rates fully adjust and there is no effect on the property tax levy, so that θ = 0. In the strongest version of revenue-elasticity fi scal illusion, rates do not adjust at all so that increases in the base are automatically translated into new spending (θ = 1). In years with mass reappraisals (A it = 1), this intuition regarding θ is unchanged, but the test is of θ + ϕ = 0 for the residual view and θ + ϕ = 1 for the fi scal illusion view. In principle, however, any substantive magnitude between zero and one demonstrates some amount of support for fi scal illusion in the reassessment process. There is no obvious expected sign for ϕ, but it is likely negative because of the constant elasticity implied by the log-log specifi cation. Since the percentage changes in assessed values are often orders of magnitude larger than those in the intervening years, the levy-growth responsiveness might be smaller in percentage terms than in non-mass reappraisal years.
The marginal effect on the levy of a mass reappraisal is provided in (6). To illustrate the intuition of this marginal effect, suppose taxable assessed value growth was zero following mass reappraisal, so that = AV ln 0; it V V this would be the case if the appraisal only served to redistribute assessed values across parcels. If the mass reappraisal allows for a form of fi scal illusion where taxpayers attribute their new tax bill solely to the reassessment, then local politicians could increase the levy and ρ would become posi- 15 Note that, while a mass reappraisal takes place between January and June of the calendar year, the millage rate derived from the property tax levy is not based on these updated values for the budgeting process until the next calendar year. So AV it is based on changes in assessed values relevant to the budget process, even though the assessor's offi ce may have already updated their parcel records. 16 Assessed values can change between reappraisals due to appeals, property improvements, and land use changes.
tive. 17 This was the specifi c test conducted by Bloom and Ladd (1982) and Ladd (1991) , except that the model employed here controls for factors other than the mass reappraisal. The full marginal effect in (6) also allows for the interaction with total assessed value growth so that it can possibly vary by magnitude of the assessment growth.
B. Variable Defi nition and Data
While the range of available data slightly differs across the variables, all series include the 2000 to 2008 period, and therefore all summary statistics (Table 1 ) and regression estimates are based on this time period. Virginia has 134 cities and counties, but three of them (Alleghany County, Newport News City, and York County) are excluded because they exchanged territory in 2001, causing large reported changes in several key variables. All variables expressed as dollars are infl ation-adjusted to 2005 dollars prior to any transformations. Real property tax levies and other sources of revenue were obtained from the Virginia Auditor of Public Accounts.
The school-age share of the population, share of the population over age 65, and racial homogeneity are included as regressors in (4) to capture the effect of changing voter characteristics V it . These are all commonly used demographic variables in the literature on demand for public services (e.g., Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly, 1999; Lind, 2007; Fletcher and Kenny, 2008) . Also included is the share of housing units which are owner-occupied, as there is some support for "renter illusion" that may cause renters to not recognize the full cost of services fi nanced by property taxes (Bergstrom and Goodman, 1973; Blom-Hansen, 2005) . 18 Annual population and housing unit estimates are provided by the U.S. Census, as are the estimates by age and race. Information on assessed values and the true fair market value of property is provided as part of the annual assessment sales ratio studies conducted by the Virginia Department of Taxation, and typically represent about three to four percent of the total parcels located in the state.
Annual estimates of median adjusted gross household income are provided by the Virginia Department of Housing and Community Development. Since the defi nition of this measure of median household income was changed in 2008, causing a large statewide increase in local estimates of income, time fi xed effects are included in every model specifi cation. The preferred measure of the median voter tax share typically used in empirical studies is the median assessed value as a share of total assessed values, with the assumption being that the median value approximates the median, or decisive, voter. Unfortunately, median assessed value is not available for any year except 2000, so instead we use the share of median income divided by total personal income in the county as a proxy for the tax share. 19 Both the ideal and the employed measures of tax price implicitly adopt the view that it is only the residential tax price that is considered by local public offi cials, who ignore non-residential tax prices.
V. ESTIMATION RESULTS
A. Main Results
Estimates of (4) are provided in Table 2 with alternative restrictions on the main variables of interest, and all specifi cations include year fi xed effects. Breusch-Pagan diagnostics for heteroskedasticity supported the use of robust standard errors, which have been clustered by county.
The coeffi cients on the control variables generally take the expected signs. The point estimates across the specifi cations in Table 2 indicate that a one percent increase in income growth was correlated with about a 0.30 percent increase in the property tax levy change. A 1 percent increase in population growth was correlated with roughly a 0.10 percent increase in the levy, while a one percent increase in the median tax share was correlated with about a 0.30 percent decline in the levy. The negative sign of the coeffi cient on median tax share, which proxies for the price to the median voter for public goods, is consistent with the existence of a downward sloping voter demand curve. Together, the population and tax price point estimates indicate that the Samuelson "publicness" index of the spending is between 0.51 and 0.40, roughly midway between a pure public and pure private good. 20 Revenue from other non-property sources was positive and statistically signifi cant, consistent with a complementary correlation with property tax revenue. The demographic variables were not statistically signifi cant.
The estimates in Table 2 also indicate that a one percent increase in the growth of the fair market value of property increases the property tax levy by a statistically signifi cant 0.04 to 0.07 percent. This is consistent with the notion of wealth effects, where property owners support more public spending as the value of their assets increase, but it is also a qualitatively small effect. 21 In specifi cations B-E, variables capturing the effect of changing taxable assessed values are included, with the estimates of the full model in (4) appearing in specifi cation E. As described earlier, changes in taxable values of property differ from the fair market value in important ways. First, the biggest changes in assessed values appear in years with mass reappraisals, which differ in frequency 19 A pairwise correlation between the preferred median tax share and the proxy variable employed in the paper was 0.95 in 2000, which was the only year such a correlation could be computed. 20 As derived in Borcherding and Deacon (1972) and discussed in the model derivation section, the Samuelson index of publicness is the coeffi cient on population divided by one plus the coeffi cient on tax price. From column E of Table 2 , this calculation is 0.280/(1-0.304)=0.401. The highest Samuelson index in Table 2 is 0.51 in column A. 21 There is nothing about the institutional design in Virginia that allows us to infer that the coeffi cient on the fair market value growth of property can be interpreted as a causal estimate of property wealth effects. It serves only to capture the accumulated wealth effects from economic growth that are not captured by the other variables.
across areas. This causes the changes in assessed values to be more volatile since the reappraisals must refl ect property value growth in all the intervening years. Secondly, taxable assessed values differ from fair market value by various property exemptions. In addition, assessor errors can result in assessment-to-sale price ratios that differ both over time and across areas. Finally, assessed value changes are not refl ected in millage Table 2 OLS Estimates of Property Tax Notes: The sample size is 1,172, with 131 cross-sectional units. Asterisks denote signifi cance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels. Robust standard errors clustered by area are reported in parentheses. All specifi cations include year fi xed effects.
Specifi cation rates until the budget of the next fi scal year. There is some remaining multicollinearity between fair market and assessed values, but it is relatively weak with variance infl ation factors of 10. Multicollinearity is not particularly troubling here since both variables have high levels of statistical signifi cance. Specifi cations B-E of Table 2 are all supportive of some amount of fi scal illusion, which is inconsistent with the residual view. Regardless of the specifi cation, growth in assessed values and in mass reappraisals are statistically signifi cant determinants of property tax levy growth. From specifi cation E it can be seen that in years without mass reappraisals A = 0, a one percent increase in assessed values results in a statistically signifi cant 0.068 percent increase in the property tax levy. For a 3.2 percent increase in assessed value growth, the observed sample mean, there is a 0.21 percent increase in the property tax levy, a magnitude that is 7 percent of the mean observed levy growth in the sample. 22 The marginal effect of assessed value growth during mass reappraisals A = 1 in (5) diminishes to 0.051 and loses statistical signifi cance.
23 At best, it seems there is some amount of fi scal illusion from assessed value growth that is statistically signifi cant, but it is substantively small and thus generally consistent with the revenue neutral adjustments in the property tax rate predicted by the residual view.
In evaluating the marginal effect of a mass reappraisal, provided in (6), consider fi rst the case with zero assessment growth (∆ln(Assessed Values) = 0) where the potential for fi scal illusion comes from a zero-sum redistribution of the property assessments across individual owners. The point estimate in column E of Table 2 suggests that mass reappraisals increase the levy growth rate by 1.5 percent. This effect shrinks by 0.017 percent for every one percentage point above zero assessment growth, though this effect is not statistically signifi cant.
In Table 3 , the specifi cations refl ect different combinations of area and year fi xed effects. Although the infl uence of time invariant omitted variables relevant to explaining the levels of the variables is eliminated with fi rst differencing, the specifi cations with the inclusion of area fi xed effects discard the infl uence of any remaining omitted variables that might affect the rate of change in the levy. Both appraisals and assessed value growth retain at least a 5 percent level of statistical signifi cance, with the magnitudes remaining relatively unchanged from those presented in Table 2 . The primary consequence of including fi xed effects is are changes in the statistical signifi cance of the other variables.
The main fi ndings presented in Tables 2 and 3 demonstrate there are some detectable amounts of fi scal illusion that are statistically signifi cant, but they are substantively small. 24 The primary interpretation is that mass reappraisals provide some cover for 22 Calculated as 3.2x0.068=0.218 and 0.218/3.0 = 0.07 (7 percent). 23 Calculated as 0.068-0.017=0.051. 24 Interestingly, although the detectable amount of fi scal illusion is small, the magnitude is comparable to the coeffi cient size on fair market value appreciation, although we cannot make comparable claims of causality.
Table 3
Property Tax Specifi cation politicians to raise levies, but the aggregate growth in taxable assessed values is largely irrelevant. In essence, politicians can raise a small amount of additional revenue through the levy under the guise that most owners will simply attribute it to their new property reassessment, but this is much more diffi cult without the cover of a mass appraisal that revalues the properties across the board. Our fi ndings are also substantially smaller than those found in most comparable previous literature on fi scal illusion with respect to property reassessments. Bloom and Ladd (1982) found that mass reappraisals were associated with a 5.1 percent levy increase in Massachusetts, but these fi ndings had no other controls for economic growth and mass appraisals were likely linked endogenously to annual levy growth. Ladd (1991) found that assessments increased property tax levies by an additional 3 to 8 percent in North Carolina counties where reassessments were likely exogenous in their timing, but once again there were no controls for economic growth. Our approach fi nds a substantively smaller amount of levy growth of approximately 1.5 percent.
B. Specifi cation Checks
The results presented in Tables 2 and 3 assumed that the wealth effects on demand of the median voter were based on the true fair market value of their property, which is derived from the state's annual sales ratio study of assessment accuracy. An alternative possibility is that the owner's primary information source of property value is assessed value. 25 To explore this possibility we take advantage of a difference in timing between when the assessed values are known to the property owner (Assessed Values 1 ) and when they are employed for the purpose of tax rate setting (Assessed Values 2 ), a lag that allows an appeal period. As previously described, the latter assessed values variable is the same measure previously employed in the measure of Assessed Value growth in Tables 2 and 3, since that refl ected the relevant opportunity to take advantage of voter fi scal illusion. Table 4 and Table 3 differ only in that the growth in fair market property values has been replaced with the growth in assessed values as they are known to the property owners. We can see that the assessed value growth known to the owners (Assessed Values 1 ) is positive and statistically signifi cant, albeit with smaller magnitudes than when the counterpart measure of fair market value growth was used in Table 3 . More importantly for our purposes, however, the magnitudes and statistical signifi cance for the variables of interest of interest, Mass Reappraisal and Assessed Values 2 , were virtually unchanged. The results in Tables 3 and 4 also provide some evidence on another possible limitation of the results. If there is error in the measure of fair market value, the positive correlation between assessed value and market value appreciation could introduce some positive bias to the estimated coeffi cient on the assessment variables. This correlation is weakened by the budgetary lag in adopting the assessed values used for rate-setting, Table 4 also reveals that when fair market value is replaced by contemporaneous assessed value growth the coeffi cients are virtually unchanged. Since the contemporaneous assessed value carries an even larger difference from market value, it seems likely that this potential bias is small.
Though not presented, some additional sensitivity checks are discussed in the remainder of this section and are available upon request. For brevity, all of the sensitivity assumptions will be compared to specifi cation D of Table 3 , the full model with both year and county fi xed effects. The fi nal year of the dataset, 2008, would have refl ected adjustments to the budgets with the housing market crash toward the end of 2007. Estimating the model without 2008 data has virtually no effect on the results. The point estimate on mass reappraisals is 1.5 percent and is statistically signifi cant at the 5 percent level, down from 1.7 percent with 1 percent signifi cance. The coeffi cient on assessed value growth remains at 0.059 with a p-value below 0.05.
Virginia state law creates heterogeneity in the frequency of mass reappraisals. A potential limitation of this law, however, is that areas with more frequent mass reappraisals will carry more weight in the mean-centered parameter estimate on the Mass Reappraisal indicator. To examine the sensitivity of the results to this phenomenon, the full model with both area and year fi xed effects was estimated with a weighted regression, where the weight was based on the inverse frequency of the number of mass reappraisals in the sample. Compared to the unweighted regression in specifi cation D of Table 3 , the point estimate on Mass Reappraisal increased to refl ect a 2.3 percent increase in property tax levies that was statistically signifi cant at the fi ve percent level. The point estimate on assessed value growth was 0.055, only slightly lower than in the unweighted regression, though its statistical signifi cance fell below the 5 percent level. Finally, there is a considerable literature in local public fi nance on tax competition among governments (Wilson, 1999; Brueckner and Saavedra, 2001 ). Using spatial econometrics to allow for property tax levy growth in neighboring jurisdictions as another control variable had no substantive effect on the main variables of interest, and the statistical signifi cance of the spatial lag carried a p-value of just 0.10.
26
Alternative specifi cations of non-property revenue, including separate controls for state and federal transfers, also had no substantive effect on our variables of interest or on the R-squares. Finally, as previously described, three areas were excluded from the regression because they changed territorial boundaries between 2000 and 2001. Including them in the regression, however, did not affect the main variables of interest within the rounding tolerance of the reported results.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The residual view of the property tax asserts that changes in assessed values have no direct infl uence on the amount of revenue raised through real property taxation because rates adjust to fi nance a fi xed level of expenditures as a matter of arithmetic (Netzer, 1964) . Critics of this view of property taxation suggest that the reassessment process creates a form of fi scal illusion, analogous to the revenue elasticity hypothesis (Oates, 1975; Dollery and Worthington, 1996) . The few papers that have previously tested these competing views directly, however, have considerable shortcomings with respect to causal identifi cation. Particularly problematic for the previous literature has been the inability to control for economic growth in an area that may be associated with changes in assessed values, as well as endogeneity in the decision to conduct reassessments. Using 2000 to 2008 data from Virginia cities and counties, this paper provides the clearest evidence to date on the validity of the residual view. We argue that the institutional structure in Virginia results in a reassessment cycle that is exogenous to a given year's levy growth, and we are able to control for confounding economic growth factors. Our fi ndings suggest that there is a statistically signifi cant but quantitatively trivial amount of fi scal illusion that allows for levy growth in response to increases in taxable assessed values. Mass reappraisals, on the other hand, do provide some cover for politicians to disguise levy increases on the order of about 1.5 percent, but the aggregate growth in taxable assessed values that occurs due to the reassessment is largely irrelevant. We speculate that mass reappraisals allow politicians to raise a small amount of additional revenue because most owners will likely ascribe changes in their tax bill primarily to their new assessments. Our fi nding on mass reappraisals is substantially smaller, however, than the most comparable fi ndings of Bloom and Ladd (1982) and Ladd (1991) , which produced estimates of 5.1 and 3 to 8 percent, respectively.
Despite the generally high visibility of the property tax to which many scholars attribute its unpopularity, this paper joins Cabral and Hoxby (2010) in fi nding evidence that this instrument is not completely exempt from fi scal illusion. To the extent the mass reappraisals allow for politicians to push levy growth above trend, this fi scal illusion detracts from the median voter theory as a descriptive theory of local government. The evidence presented in this paper, of course, is qualifi ed by the external validity of applying Virginia results to other states. States like California, Florida, and Michigan place limits on the ability of local governments to raise revenue through the property tax, which may induce local governments to strategically raise levies beyond current median voter demands in anticipation of being unable to raise levies again in the future.
It is possible that additional laws promoting tax transparency may help circumvent this phenomenon. Some states have adopted "truth in taxation" laws that apply to the property tax, which can include the publication of important ballot information or direct mailings of budget information (Youngman and Malme, 2005) . In Virginia, cities and counties must only publish an announcement in the local newspaper if levies are to increase more than one percent in a particular year. It is possible that strengthening such laws, perhaps by informing property taxpayers what their individual liability would have been under the previous year's levy, might assist in overcoming the fi scal illusion that occurs in mass reappraisal years. Limiting the discretionary power of local politicians over general purpose budgets, for example by requiring voter approval for signifi cant tax levy increases, might also be a step towards constraining such behavior.
